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IN ROMANIA 
 
General Budgetary Framework 
Some aspects of intergovernmental finance, such as the systems of tax 
sharing and equalization, have been reasonably well documented and 
discussed in Romania so far. By contrast, the situation with the transfers for 
investment coming from line ministries, special funds or the general budget is 
much less clear. Currently there is little in the way of criteria governing the 
allocation of these funds in territory, by local government tier or unit, though 
the sums vehiculated are substantial. Instead, money comes on an ad hoc 
basis to take care of “special needs and local situations”, or in response to 
political pressure. Special funds are usually insulated from the general budget 
and are enacted, funded, and disbursed on their own ambiguous and non-
transparent rules. However when the special funds are dismantled the 
situation may gets even worse, since then even the total pool of funds to be 
earmarked for a certain service becomes unpredictable (as it happened with 
the Special Fund for Roads in 2003). 
The policy consequences of this kind of arrangements are easy to 
anticipate: 
• These are the least transparent elements of the revenue allocation process, 
and as a result likely to encourage political clientelism and rent seeking. 
• Since the distribution tends to be discretionary, the process may create 
informal hierarchical relations between the tiers of state administration, 
even when the law says that there should be no such thing. Central 
ministries or county councils, lacking more modern instruments to pursue 
wider policy goals, are tempted to use pressure instead of incentives in 
order to ensure localities’ compliance. 
• The link between the patterns of distribution and national strategies is often 
not apparent. The logic of regional development often clashes with the 
practice of sectoral allocation, in an environment where cross-departmental 
communication is very difficult.  
• Special funds and investment transfers, whether part of the general budget 
or not, may function as strong counter-equalizers, and hence make the 
whole effort to design a good equalization system irrelevant. The lack of 
feed-back channels in the Romanian process of policy-making, as well as 
the shortage of analytic capacity in central and local governments, make it 
difficult to discern and understand such social effects when they appear.  
The current practices and policies governing the interaction of localities, 
counties and the central government create obstacles for all parties. The use 
of inappropriate tools by the county council impairs the autonomy of the 
localities, especially rural communes.  In turn, the counties lack appropriate 
tools to address countywide needs and priorities. This is exacerbated by a 
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tendency for one on one interaction between localities and the county council 
to pursue individual needs and priorities, which is unavoidable when there are 
no general rules that may apply to all. The same observations are true 
regarding the relationship between the central government and counties. 
Three important policy areas with substantial intergovernmental financial 
transfers are analyzed in this material. They are: (i) Residential District 
Heating; (ii) Housing; (iii) Roads. They all imply a substantial capital 
investment component and are financed through a combination of money flows 
coming from different sources. Local governments (LGs) are free to contribute 
with their own funds to any of these functions (some contributions for 3 are 
mandatory anyway), but the bulk of the spending is done with funds received 
from the central budget through transfers.  
 
Fig. A below is an attempt to disentangle and map all the current 
intergovernmental financial transfers in Romania, to the extent that this is 
possible, and organize the functionally by service and source. The data comes 
from: the Ministry of Finance, which centralizes a set of financial info from all 
LGs (both tiers); the annual budget laws and executions from the respective 
years; and data collected directly from relevant line ministries and agencies. 
The analysis is still preliminary, as some cells are still to be filled in and some 
allocation procedures to be confirmed. However, even in this form we believe 
the table can serve as an useful guide for understanding intergovernmental 
transfers in Romania in general. The following correspondence exists between 
the three policy areas selected and the financial flows identified in Fig. A. 
 Items in Fig. A Obs. 
(i) Roads 18, 19  
 
 
20 (partially) 
Roads Special Fund was abolished 
in 2003 and money come directly 
from the Ministry of Transp. 
Rehabilitation of rural roads is also 
financed from item 20 
(ii) Housing 21 
a, b, c, d 
Direct transfers 
Direct financing by the Min of 
Transp of a local function (and 
property) = implicit transfer; some 
money may be counted twice in 21 
/ and a, b, c, d – Min Trasp's 
budget is not clear 
(iii) Residential 
heating 
3 (partially) 
8, 9 
24, 25, 26 
Direct (user) subsidy 
Indirect (price) subsidy 
Grants for the rehabilitation of 
local utilities 
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   Fig. A. The system of intergovernmental transfers in Romania    
          
Item 
no.    
bn 
Rol 2001 2002 2003 2004*  
                   
(1) PIT  Shares ("cote") (36.5 / 10 / 16%) quasi-own   25,252 27,414 37,269 40,900  
   PIT (100%)  37,244 43,863 59,154 64,921  
                   
 PIT Lump sums ("sume defalcate")       
(2)  "Equalization"   4,000 9,278 15,717 21,650  
(3) 
  
Social welfare (income, 
heating – direct subsidy) L416  - 4,375
 
7,727 8,526  
(4)   Child protection  - - 1,926 3,226  
(5)   Culture, art  - 595 814 921  
(6)  Eq. proper Own, counties  1,020 1,092 1,336  
(7)  Eq. proper Localities  2,980 3,216 3,914
8,977
 
(8)   
Price subsidy 
(indirect), heating     2,524 3,044 3,597
 
-  
                   
(9) VAT 
Price subsidy, 
heating   - - - 7,647  
(10)  Education prim+sec   21,463 27,382 33,991 37,960  
(11)   County (special needs)  932 1,190 2,664 3,619  
(12)   Localities  20,531 26,192 31,327 34,341  
(13)  Kindergartens   103 169 203 235  
(14)  Counties: agro-consultancies  94 131 157 182  
(15)  Counties: child protection  - 1,668 - -  
(16)   Handicapped protection   - 1,869 - -  
   TVA (100%)  71,517 93,382 124,572 156,189  
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(17) General budget - other earmarked funds  3,964 4,327 7,366 7,900  
(18)  Roads Special fund  1,900 1,966
 
- -  
(19)  Roads Ministry of Transp.  - - 2,288 2,495  
(20)  Rural water / roads (Min Transp)  402 420 400 420  
(21)  Housing  funds (Min Transp)   357 385 404  
(22)  Other (Min Transp)    106 159 70  
(23)  Total grants from Min Transp   883 3,232 3,389  
          
(a)   National housing programs (Min Transp)     2,709 3,460 4,038
(b)  Finalize apts. begun before '90 (OG 19/94)     299 294 309
(c)  Social housing (L114/96)     30 36 38
(d)   Houses for the youth       2,380 3,130 3,691
Funds are not all 
transferred to LGs; 
may overlap with 
(21) 
          
(24)  Special energy fund  25 50
 
- -  
(25)  MAI  - - 55 59  
(26)   
Grants for 
restructuring local 
heating providers 
Ministry of Economy   - 97 373 235  
          
(27) Subsidies for cofinancing foreign loans   945 734 900 1,800  
  * 2004 data based on the provisions of the State Budget Law        
       
  Not included:        
  National Fund for Regional Development       
  
 
Investments of public companies / utilities into the local infrastructure (esp. by extending the water / gas / electricity grid), which are off-
budget local investments influenced by decisions taken at the central level 
 
    Arrows show changes in the structure of transfers
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1. RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT HEATING POLICY 
 
Summary of problems 
• Residential district heating (DH) is currently financed through a 
complicated combination of financial flows, involving several separate 
ministries at the central level and both tiers of local government, without 
any of them having full resposibility (or data) for the whole policy. 
Therefore not only management becomes difficult, but even constructing 
a complete picture of the system is a dauting task. 
• Two policy goals cohabitate uneasily: investment in rehabilitation and 
social protection through subsidization. Currently the latter tends to 
prevail (especially in the form of an indirect – price – subsidy) which 
means the system is biased towards status quo. In the same time a 
process of self-selection occurs among clients, with the most well-off 
disconnecting from the system due to poor service quality and thus 
aggravating the problems of solvability of the operators.  
• Investment in DH rehabilitation falls significantly short when compared 
with the government's own targets (the 2001 Strategy). Local crises tend 
to be solved by tampering with other distribution mechanisms that are 
supposed to be formula-based (such as the equalization grants).  
 
1. 1. Overview, supply, regulation, costs 
About 90% of the block of flats in Romania, mostly built after 1960, are 
connected to district heating systems (DH). As the 2002 census data show, 
about 2/3 of the urban residential units (35% nationwide) use this system. 
The supply of DH goes mostly to households (90% of the total in 2002) as 
the commercial users have gradually moved towards more efficient and 
flexible solutions. Therefore, after 1989 the generation and delivery of 
heating have become less and less, on its client side, an issue of industrial 
restructuring, but one linked with the general social protection policies of the 
state. And since social protection has been increasingly redefined as a local 
mandate, the burden of reshaping this policy has also been passed on the 
shoulders of local authorities. The process culminated in 2001, when a 
substantial part of the heating supply was transferred to LGs, in the form of 
18 power generation units previously belonging to the national public 
company Termoelectrica (accounting for 40% of the heat production and 
10% electricity production of the company). Later on five more units were 
passed to local governments, so that the total number became 23. In 2003, 
the heating for the population and other industrial users is supplied by1: 
                                                 
1 Data from Analysis of District Heating Sector in Romania, 2000-2002. Daniel Aizic, World 
Bank, 2003.  
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• the national company Termoelectrica (about 30% of total) 
• local power plants owned by LGs or other parties (about 70%) 
The power plants are of two types:  
• With cogeneration (CHP) – they produce both electricity and heating and 
thus are on average more efficient; this is the case with the 18 units 
externalized by Termoelectrica in 2001 
• Heating producers only (HOB) 
The CHP plants, whether they are owned by Termoelectrica, LGs or other 
entities, are put under the authority of the National Agency for Energy 
Regulation (ANRE) which is empowered to monitor supply, approve price 
levels and profit margins, and in general ensure the quality of the output. 
The local heating distributors and the HOB producers owned by LGs are 
regulated, together with other local services, since 2002 by the newly 
created National Agency for Regulating Communal Services (ANRSC – 
OG373/2002). More than one year after it has been set up ANRSC is still a 
fledgling agency in the process of developing capacity. The fine details of the 
cooperation between the two regulatory bodies are still to be worked out in 
practice. Fig. 2 below shows how the supply system functions. 
Fig. 2. The structure of supply and regulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank, 2003 
ANRE 
(CHP)
The Ministry of Public 
Administration  
CHP DH operators 
Captive consumers 
ANRSC 
(HOB) 
TERMOELECTRICA 
Local 
ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT  
The Ministry of Industry and 
Resources
HOB/Distributors 
Private service suppliers 
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Local government has played a more substantial role after the passing of Law 
326/2001 on Local public services, since their responsibility was emphasized 
in managing local utility services (including DH, but excluding CHP), water 
supply and sewage, cleaning, public transportation, and public domain. LGs 
have now exclusive competence in establishing, organizing, coordinating, 
monitoring and controlling public utility services. DH system assets are public 
and/or private domain of local administrations. Two main types of utility 
services management will be possible: direct management commissioned 
through specialized departments of the local administration; and indirect 
management (concession) whereby the local administration concludes 
management contracts with private companies.  
Local administrations, however, preserve the rights:  
• to adopt policies and strategies for development of the utility services;  
• to monitor, control, and supervise the compliance with the contractual 
obligations, the quality of services and the parameters of services of 
the operators; the administration and management of the public 
systems from the infrastructure handled over by concession; 
• to determine or validate prices for local public services. 
The Government provides technical and financial assistance to the local 
administration in establishing and organizing local public services.  
The technical condition of the plants producing heating for local communities 
varies a lot, depending on the age of the equipment, technical solution and 
quality of maintenance. The combinations of fuel used also vary. The effect is 
that producer costs are very different from one place to another, thus posing 
acute problems of management and social policy, both at the national and 
local level. For example, when the 23 plants were transferred from 
Termoelectrica, LGs were in general very reluctant to take over, raising 
objections as to the lack of financial resources to maintain operations and 
commission investments, and the lack of technical and managerial skills to 
supervise activities of the plants.  
They also knew these were the most inefficient plants of Termoelectrica, with 
an average production cost of 31$/Gcal, above the company average of 
18$/Gcal, and the most burdened with arrears: their outstanding receivables 
were about 40% of the turnover at that moment. Since then the government 
has tried to help the new owners (LGs), either with subsidies (items 3, 8, 9 in 
Fig. A above) or targeted investment programs (items 24-26), but the sheer 
magnitude of the problem makes it difficult to find a solution in such a short 
time. 
Fig. 3 offers an image of the wide variation in costs and prices charged by 
local utilities. Data were collected by the World Bank (2003) from a sample 
of 31 power plants in large cities. Together they supply about 2/3 of the total 
residential heating consumed in Romania and cover about 70% of the 
households relying on DH. As the data show, disparities are high: both the 
operational costs and the final price range roughly between 1:3 (with 
54$/Gcal the highest cost, in Suceava). The quantity of heat lost in the 
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system (producer+distributor) also varies a lot, between 4 and 40%, usually 
the highest leaks plaguing the most inefficient producers, which increases 
their break-even price even higher.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2. Social policy 
In order to cope with these discrepancies a social policy was gradually put in 
place with two components: direct (user) and indirect (producer) 
subsidization of the heating price. A National Reference Price (NRP) was 
introduced as an element of national policy which is set and periodically 
adjusted by ANRE. The evolution over time of the NRP is shown in Fig. 4.  
The DH consumers pay only the NRP (and VAT on it starting with 2000). Until 
the fall of 2003 the difference between the local price and NRP was covered 
by the indirect (producer) subsidy with funds coming:  
• 45% from the national budget  
• 55% from the local budget 
Starting with Oct 2003 the formula was dropped (OU 81/2003), and while 
the intergovernmental transfer is still operational there is no legal 
requirement anymore that it should amount to exactly the 45% share of the 
indirect subsidy. In exchange, the LGs have got the right to deviate up from 
the NRP, and as a result have the residents of a particular city pay more per 
Gcal if the local council decides they want to pay less indirect subsidy.  
 
Fig. 3. Variations in producer price for 31 suppliers, 2002
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In addition, a direct (user) subsidy is paid by local governments to the 
poorest urban dwellers based on means-testing, for a period of five winter 
months. The schedule of subsidization has six income brackets also specified 
by national laws and updated regularly (currently OU 81/2003), as part of a 
uniform and mandatory national policy. As a result, there are three streams 
of funds which define the social policy in the area of residential heating: 
A. An indirect subsidy from the central government: an intergovernmental 
transfer specified in the Annual Budget Law in the form of a lump sum 
allocated by county. The County Councils subsequently pass the money 
down to localities, which in turn give it to the heating producers. Until Oct 
2003 it (presumably) covered 45% of the difference between local price 
and NRP; after that there is no such requirement. This component is 
displayed as budget item (8-9) in Fig. A above. The allocation of this 
transfer seems to function more or less as specified: for the same sample 
of 31 producers we find a robust correlation between the need for 
subsidization (big difference local price / NRP) and the money actually 
transferred to the respective LGs as they are reported to the Ministry of 
Finance (Fig. 5). This is good news, since it happens often that counties 
interfere with financial transfers destined to the lower tier and alter their 
original allocation patterns.  
B. An indirect subsidy from the local government: money paid by the LG 
from its own sources of revenue, on top of A. Until Oct 2003 it was 
supposed to cover the remaining 55% of the difference between local 
price and NRP.  
Fig. 4. National reference price (NRP), heating, $/Gcal
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C. A direct subsidy to the poorest users. Here too the central government 
finances partially this mandate, though there is no reliable estimate of its 
aggregated cost to LGs and therefore no way to tell, from data currently 
available in the public domain what fraction is covered by the transfer 
nationwide2. The transfer item (3) in Fig. A is meant to finance both the 
heating allowance and the minimum income policy, as well as a number of 
other social functions (protection of handicapped persons, etc), and as a 
result it cannot be broken down by functional categories. Moreover, the 
LGs have to contribute money from their own revenues to fulfilling these 
social functions, and the total amount of this contribution is again 
something impossible to asses at the national level based on the currently 
existing data, because the reporting structure does not contain such 
breakdowns. In 2002 the scope of this subsidy was broadened, allowing 
households who use natural gas and solid fuel for heating to apply for 
support from LGs. The same principle of means-testing applies in their 
case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What we do know from anecdotal evidence, however, is that LGs have 
experienced severe financial strains after they received the new social policy 
mandates. In many places they are not able to pay their 55% share of 
indirect subsidy – but the same seem to be true about the central 
                                                 
2 Although officials in the national government – especially the Ministry of Administration and 
Interior – usually claim that they keep tabs on C, they have not yet produced the data in the 
public domain to prove it.  
Fig. 5. Correlation between local need and price subsidy, 2002
R 2  = 0.6667
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government, since the transfer grant has never reached its legal target of 
45% (Fig. 6). Thus both central and local governments are generators of 
arrears in the energy sector, though probably the latter play a larger role. 
Fig. 6. The fraction of the indirect subsidy actually covered by the 
transfer 
2001 2002 2003
Total indirect subsidy (central+local), bn Rol 6,176 7,260 8,288
Indirect subsidy, central, bn Rol 2,524 3,044 3,597
Indirect subsidy, central, % 40.9% 41.9% 43.4%
Source: ANRE, MoF 
 
1.3. Case study: Galaţi 
In order to make up for this shortage of data we focused on just one 
municipality from where we have collected data first-hand: Galaţi city, in the 
eastern part of Romania, size about 300,000. Fig. 7 and the data in the table 
below presents the situation of DH in general and the details of the 
subsidization on all three components (A, B, C), allowing for a more refined 
discussion about what the residential heating policy means for a typical 
Romanian city where the local utility is not an outlayer in terms of price and 
efficiency (see Fig. 3).  
A number of interesting developments become now apparent which confirm 
those few data available at the aggregate level. 
• The indirect (producer) subsidy is still dominant by far, in spite of the 
stated national policy to shift towards direct subsidization of users. The 
indirect subsidy (own sources and the grant) amounts to 12% of the local 
budget, the direct subsidy to just 1%. In other words, a lot of resources 
are put into a general subsidy going to households that may not 
necessarily need it, while those who really need subsidization get trivial 
amounts of money: on average 1.1 mil Rol/household for the current 5 
winter months (about 30$).  
• Component A represents only about 35% of the difference between the 
producer price and NRP, instead of the legal 45%. On the other hand the 
LG also generates arrears of payment, with outstanding debts of about 
4% of the local budget. The unpredictable way in which this new mandate 
was created two years ago created a lot of financial difficulties for LG and 
made their budget even more rigid: when, as in the case of Galati, about 
half of it has to be spent on salaries and part on the rest on other 
mandates (such as income support), there is little else left to finance true 
local priorities.  
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 Galaţi municipality, the winter 2003-04    
(a) Number of households connected to DH 87,000 87% of total 
(a) Number of households connected to DH applying for heating allowance (direct subsidy) 21,000 24.1% of connected 
(a) Total heating allowance to be distributed this winter (5 months), mil Rol 23,600   
(a) Average sum/household, 5 months, mil Rol 1.12   
     
(b) Number of households using gas who apply for heating allowance 2,736   
(b) Total heating allowance to be distributed this winter (5 months), mil Rol 930   
(b) Average sum/household, 5 months, mil Rol 0.34   
     
(C) Number of households using solid fuel who get support from the local council 550   
(c) Total heating allowance to be distributed this winter (5 months), mil Rol 134   
(c) Average sum/household, 5 months, mil Rol 0.24   
     
 Galati LG budget 1,675,939   
 Total direct (user) heating subsidy from the Galati local council, mil Rol 24,664 1.47% of budget 
 Total energy bill (estimate), 5 months, mil Rol 816,000   
 Difference to be covered (local price - NRP), bn Rol 212,900   
 Indirect (producer) heating subsidy transferred from the central budget, mil Rol 74,000 34.8% of the need 
 Indirect (producer) heating subsidy which should come from Galati LG own sources, mil Rol 138,900 65.2% of the need 
 Indirect (producer) heating subsidy which should come from Galati LG own sources, % in local budget  8.29% of budget 
     
 Total spending by Galati LG on direct and indirect heating subsidies, 5 months, mil Rol 163,564 9.76% of budget 
 Overdue debts by the population, cumulative, mil Rol 800,000 about 1 year production 
 Number of households with overdue bills, estimate 15,600 17.9% of total 
 Overdue debts by the LG, cumulative, mil Rol (estimate) 65,000 3.88% of budget 
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• The biggest debtor to the local utility is however the population, with 
outstanding debts of 800,000 bn Rol, ie about ½ of the total local budget 
or the value of heating production for the whole year 2003. The situation 
cannot be unrelated to the first point above: better targeting the funds, 
by shifting them towards direct subsidization, will also allow an increase in 
per-family allocations. This may be also important for the producer: the 
18% of consumers who have arrears of payment (outstanding bills older 
that 3 months) are probably to be found among the 24% of households 
who apply for support from LG.  
• In Galaţi, 95% or more of the direct subsidy go to DH users; while the 
share of support for the households using gas and solid fuel remains 
trivial. In other localities, especially small ones, the situation may be 
different.  
• For social and political reasons LG are reluctant to raise price above NRP, 
as they authorized to do, especially in an electoral year. They need more 
incentives to do that – such as allowing them to shift funds among A-B-C 
components – or otherwise the flexibilization of the system introduced in 
2003 would look more like the central government throwing the hot 
potato in their lap: since prices have to be raised anyway, let LGs pay the 
political costs for that.  
• Although the bulk of arrears appear to be generated by households, there 
are reasons to believe that at least some overdue debts of local public 
institutions are not recorded and reported accurately. Most likely, they are 
underestimated, since (i) penalties for late payments are not applied 
(following a controversial instruction from the Court of Accounts), or (ii) 
deferred payments for which a rescheduling was negotiated with the 
Fig. 7. Heating subsidies in the Galati local budget
2% 5% 9%
37%
19%
28%
Total direct (user) heating subsidy
from the Galati local council, mil
Rol
Indirect (producer) heating
subsidy transferred from the
central budget, mil Rol
Indirect (producer) heating
subsidy which should come from
Galati LG own sources, mil Rol
Personnel
Other welfare support
ROMANIAN ACADEMIC SOCIETY (SAR) 
 18
supplier are not considered arrears in the sense these are defined by OU 
81/20033.  
 
1.4. Preliminary conclusions  
• Heating provision in local communities is a cross-cutting area of policy 
where the priorities in three domains have to be carefully balanced: sound 
decentralization based on clear rules and local autonomy; the reforming 
of the energy sector; and social protection considerations. So far, the 
need to increase nominally the cost-effectiveness of the centrally-
controlled energy sector seems to have prevailed when some of the most 
inefficient power generators were handed over to LGs in the fall of 2002. 
The 45-55% formula for dividing the indirect subsidy between center and 
localities was an attempt to align the motivations of the two tiers of 
government, but it also created a lot of financial distress at the local level 
by making the LG budgets even more rigid than they were before.  
• An element of flexibility was introduced in 2003 when the 45-55% 
formula was dropped, and the LGs were authorized to raise the heating 
price to consumers above the NRP. However, this also created uncertainty 
in the system, in spite of the informal pledge of the government that its 
support will remain more or less the same in absolute terms. Moreover, 
under the current structure of transfers and responsibilities the LGs have 
no real incentive to pay the political price of increasing the price/Gcal, 
since whoever does this will receive less funds the following year in the 
form of price subsidy grants (component A). The fact that 2004 is a year 
with local and national elections only complicates the problem.  
• The current emphasis on the indirect subsidy, out of which an unspecified 
amount is used for investments in rehabilitation, represents a 
misallocation of resources – an indirect transfer towards the majority who 
may be able to pay a higher price from a minority of consumers (20-25% 
in the case of Galaţi) who are not able to pay. Since the direct support 
they receive is rather small, they keep accumulating arrears and magnify 
the problems in the energy sector.  
• Compared to the total amount of the indirect subsidy (7,640 bn Rol in 
2004) the special earmarked grants for rehabilitation projects (less than 
300 bn Rol in 2004) are a pittance.  
• Trying to solve the problem in one area by destroying mechanisms that 
function well in others is poor policy. This is the case of OU 81/2003, 
which attempts to deal with the arrears of payments generated by LGs, 
which allegedly do not pay their share of the indirect subsidy, by making 
the transfer of the equalization grants and the PIT shares (items 7 and 1 
in Fig. A) conditional upon the disbursing of money to utilities. Not only is 
                                                 
3 But sometimes they can also be over-estimated by mistake, as it happens in Giurgiu county 
where some heating bills of schools are counted twice (DFID Report on Arrears in 
Decentralized Finance and Management Project, December 2003).  
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this questionable from the legal point of view, but it also creates informal 
subordination between tiers of LG, since it authorizes county council 
presidents to make direct decisions on localities' budgets.  
• The current high level of indirect subsidization also distorts the market by 
blocking entry and locking in the inefficient status quo. Moreover, asking 
permission from the monopolist to disconnect from the service, as the 
current rules request, is not exactly a competitive arrangement. This 
highly subsidized status quo prevents the searching for better / more 
flexible alternatives for those households who could otherwise afford 
them. It is an illusion that keeping the better-off households captive in 
the system – as the government is tempted to do, by gradually erecting 
administrative obstacles for those who want to disconnect themselves – 
will help cross-subsidize the least well-off. In the current structure 
everybody is subsidized in a very inefficient way.  
And a policy agenda: 
• The role of each tier of government, primarily central and local, have to 
be better defined, and the responsibilities more clearly spelled out. This 
goes from reaching a workable modus vivendi between the two regulatory 
authorities (ANRE and ANRSC), to the clarification of the 
intergovernmental financial flows which have to be put on a more 
predictable, formulaic basis. Ideally, the DH section of the National 
Strategy for Decentralization (if there's ever going to be one, and 
whatever its name) should clarify the possible roles to be played by each 
government tier: owners / operators / beneficiaries / regulators. Even if 
reforms are urgent – and in the energy sector more than anywhere – 
these reforms should not be implemented at the expense of the still-
fragile LGs.  
• Social subsidies (A, B, C) have to be unified into one pool of funds and 
allocated in a way that is fair and transparent, but also stimulates LGs to 
make their own decisions on policy trade-offs, and creates incentives to 
economize at the local level. The emphasis will have to change anyway 
from indirect to direct (user) subsidization, and LGs will have to be 
allowed to experiment various social protections schemes. The 
administrative costs of implementing national mandates, to the extent 
that they exist, should also be assessed (for example, given the trivial 
amount of resources distributed to users of gas and solid fuel, does it 
make sense to continue with them?). 
• In any case, social subsidies will have to be clearly separated from the 
investments programs in the rehabilitation of utilities. Right now, the 
indirect subsidy (A and B) is a little bit of both. The funds available in the 
national budget for upgrading the generation plants (items 24-26 in Fig. 
A) will have to become more visible and predictable, as part of a long-
term national strategy.  
• The current window of opportunity should not be squandared – 
substantial restructuring in the financing mechanisms are probably easier 
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to implement now, when fuel is relatively cheap due to a devalued USD, 
than it was three years ago or may be three years from now.  
• However, money for these rehabilitation programs should not be spread 
thinly across the board. There should not be massive investment in 
systems which are going to be dismantled sooner or later, as they have 
no chance to break even due to high costs (Fig. 3). In fact, the situations 
vary a lot from one place to the other, and probably there is no general 
solution which can be applied overall. Solutions working for CHP suppliers 
may not work in the case of HOB. Alternatives will have to be explored – 
including the radical one: getting rid of the DH system altogether (like in 
Baia Mare city). The central government should attempt to remain as 
financially neutral as possible towards all viable forms of provision.  
• Technical problems and trade-offs have to be clearly spelled out and 
debated, not merely hinted at indirectly in press statements when a new 
regulation is announced. It is a pity that the government has not yet 
produced a policy paper on such an important subject, since they do have 
some data and analytic capacities in the central agencies which are not 
accessible to the wider public.  
• Good policies are based on good knowledge and analysis, and these 
presuppose at least a minimum of data that describe the situation at the 
national level / or split by tier of government / components of financing, 
etc. Such data are largely absent now. A systematic revision is necessary 
of the information flows pertaining to residential heating policy, in order 
to organize and supplement them. It is unacceptable when an important 
policy that implies substantial amount of funds, and in which mandates 
are created and changed all the time, is lacking even the most 
rudimentary measuring and evaluation instruments. At a minimum, a 
database should exist with info about all the LGs regarding all the heating 
subsidies they receive or pay, and all the investment grants they have 
access to, separate from other LG functions. The database should be 
accessible to all interested parties and facilitate informed discussion 
before legislation is initiated – not after. DH reform will not succeed if 
policy-makers will continue to grope around in the dark. 
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2. HOUSING POLICY 
Summary of problems 
• Housing seems to be the domain where the assignment of responsibilities 
by tiers of government is less clear among the three policy areas 
discussed in this material. It is the one where the instruments of public 
intervention were created rather late, in the second half of the last 
decade. And also the one which is by far the least likely to meet its 
overambitious objectives.  
• There has been considerable confusion and policy drift in terms of the 
main goals of intervention: commercially-based operations of the National 
Housing Agency (ANL) are not clearly separated from the social 
components, or other prestige projects unrelated with housing. A 
significant shift of resources has taken place from the first component 
towards the others. 
• Even the success of the commercially-based component is under 
question, as there is some evidence that ANL has developed the type of 
residential houses that would have been built by the private sector 
anyway (up-market), while it did little to respond to the unmet demand 
on the lower-middle segment. The implicit social reallocation through 
explicit and implicit subsidization is morally questionable – and since the 
subsidy is large the system tends to create strong incentives for rent-
seeking. Private business associations have estimated the subsidy to the 
ANL clients from each Romanian family at about 120 Euro/year.  
• Local governments were affected in many ways by this policy pursued 
mostly by default, as there has been little consultation with them by the 
central government when plans were initiated or changed. For example, 
the bolstering of the social component creates a lot of municipal 
residential property which has to be managed professionally, while most 
LGs are unprepared for this mandated task. The rules for deciding where 
and how to build are unclear. Both the commercial and social components 
of the housing policy presuppose significant indirect subsidization by local 
governments, much beyond their current ability to spend, and its 
magnitude and social effects have never been seriously assessed.  
 
2.1. Inherited situation: high demand and low supply of houses on 
the market 
Construction has been one of the most dynamic sectors of the economy in 
Romania after 1990, as many individuals and organizations – but mostly 
private operators – have rushed to improve or renew their property, 
following decades of underinvestment and decay under Communism. Today, 
after more than ten years, the diversification of real estate property is 
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impressive, reflecting the changing economic conditions and aspirations of 
various social groups. While low income strata, especially in urban areas, are 
trapped in the high-rise project houses (block of flats) built ages ago under 
Communism, the emerging upper middle classes have started to move out 
into newly built or renovated detached houses.  
But even Communist-time condominiums have begun to differentiate, the 
attractiveness (and hence, price) of a flat being influenced much more 
significantly than before by the quality of the neighborhood and the capacity 
of the "associations of owners" to raise funds in order to rehabilitate the 
building. As a result, the real estate market in most Romanian cities and 
towns is nowadays dual:  
• with a thin upper tier which enables a number of well-off people to move 
into new houses built and sold at prices close to the Western level per 
sqm;  
• and a heavy bottom of mass transactions through which ownership in 
existing houses, and especially flats in condominiums, is rationalized, 
passing from those who own more than they need to those who are able 
to outbid current owners 
The problem is, only the first component adds to the existing housing stock, 
which on average is old and of low quality4. But so far even these additions 
were rather drops in an ocean. There is a significant demand for reasonably 
priced, mid-quality new houses, and for various reasons – such as the low 
interest of developers and construction companies, who find the margin of 
profit too low on this segment – the market is slow to meet this kind of 
demand.  
Moreover, the mass privatization of flats that took place in 1990-91 was a big 
lost opportunity to initiate a sustainable housing policy. Back then, most 
property built during communist times was sold to tenants at "social prices" – 
i.e. sums ranging between the average salary for three months and a bus 
ticket price – in an unprecedented one-off transfer of residential property. 
More than one million housing units have been privatized this way. 
Unfortunately, this move did little to change the attitudes entrenched in the 
post-Communist societies and make people feel that from now on "the state" 
would not give people houses any more. What is more, the possibility was 
forgone to set more realistic prices for the public property given away, which 
people would pay in installments over the long run, and thus create a rolling 
fund to finance new investments. How important this could have been it 
would become apparent in 1999-2000, when the cash-strapped center-right 
coalition struggled hard to find money to set up the National Housing Agency 
(ANL – more on it below). 
                                                 
4 According to an estimate 56% of the residential buildings in Romania have fully recovered 
the initial investment, in other words they have reached the end of their functional life – 
Country Profiles on the Housing Sector. Romania. UN, NY and Geneva, 2001.  
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Fig. 1 summarizes all these elements and shows that a new house is still 
beyond the reach of most Romanians. Most affected by the situation 
presented above are the younger families who do not happen to inherit a 
property and must raise cash to buy it, some tenants evicted from buildings 
restituted to old owners, and the social vulnerable groups who have never 
owned their own residence. With the average price of a new, 100 sqm flat at 
the level of the total average salary for more than 10 years, it is practically 
impossible to save / or repay the loan / out of a normal income. The high 
inflation of the last decade – both an effect and cause of economic 
uncertainty – delayed the appearance of a truly mortgage loan market until 
two-three years ago, and even now the costs of borrowing are still high.  
The poor instruments for urban management and securing property rights 
were also part of the Communist legacy. Many localities in Romania still do 
not have General Zoning Plans (PUZ) and the institution of land cadastre is in 
its infancy. Municipal inspectorates for constructions are weak and the offices 
issuing of building permits are regarded as one of the most corrupt local 
services.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. Addressing the problem after 1990: housing policy in Romania 
Given the magnitude of the problem the idea has always been present that 
state intervention is necessary, though the details and the instruments of 
intervention were never clearly spelled out. It was only in 1994 and, 
Fig. 1. Capacity to purchase a house 
(CPH = price of a 100 sqm new flat / yearly salary)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Source: Ministry of Public Works, 1999
CPH
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
%CPH in developed countries…
...Hungary
...Romania
Inflation in Romania (right scale)
ROMANIAN ACADEMIC SOCIETY (SAR) 
 24
especially, at the end of 1996, with the adoption of a Law of Housing, that 
the first explicit elements of active social policy were introduced:  
• first, buildings under construction in December 1989 were to be 
completed and allocated "preferably" to young people who had never had 
a property of their own; 
• and second, a stock of social houses would be created to be administered 
by the municipalities and rented to the most urgent social cases in their 
communities 
However, these programs could hardly make a difference. While the total 
solvable demand for houses was estimated at about 200,000 in 19995, the 
total output of the two programs since 1997 is around 10-11,000 units. What 
is more, roughly 90% of them come from the first component, which means 
they were completed at substantially lower costs. As the stock of residential 
buildings begun before 1989 and left unfinished runs out, the cost of putting 
new apartments on the market shoots up and the pace of construction slows 
down (Fig. 2).  
In an attempt to deal with these problems a National Housing Agency 
(ANL) was set up in 1999 with the aim to bolster the mortgage credit in 
Romania and improve the situation of the existing housing stock, by the 
construction of new residential areas in cities. A pool of funds was to be 
created through transfers from the general budget and international loans, 
while the cooperation of local governments was important because they 
would have to provide the land free of charge and finance the extension of 
the local infrastructure to the new neighborhoods. On top of that, the new 
owners would be exempt from paying property tax until they repay the loan.  
Fig. 2. Components of the housing policy: number of units completed 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001-02 
Program for Youth (unfinished 
buildings) 
3,257 2,096 2,271 1,187 - 
Social Housing  10 215 444 464 
National Housing Agency (ANL), 
mortgage loans 
   389 711 
ANL, units to let to young 
married 
    1,880 
Social Housing (unfinished 
buildings) 
    1,807 
Sursă: Ministry of Transportation and Public Works, 2003 
                                                 
 N. Noica, 2003. Politici de locuire în România. Editura Maşina de Scris. Nicolae Noica was 
Minister for Public Works between 1997 and 2000.  
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As it was initially defined, the main goal of ANL was to create a growing 
owner-occupied housing stock of European standards through construction 
financed by mortgage loans. In operational terms ANL's main task was to 
facilitate financial agreements and manage financial resources for the 
construction, purchase, rehabilitation, consolidation and extension of 
residential units. The loans were made in extremely favorable terms, given 
the adverse conditions on the Romanian financial market in 1999-00: 
downpayment was 20% of the total price of the house, and the loans were 
truly long term spanning over 20 to 25 years.  
Plans were ambitious, as 6-7,000 new units were planned to be built in the 
first few years. Both ANL and the Ministry of Transportation and Public Works 
(MTPW) – which de facto supervises the Agency's operations – would thus 
become involved into designing and implementing a number of large-scale 
urban projects, some of which included the construction of privately owned 
housing units financed by mortgages. These projects were located in 
Bucharest (Băneasa district and several other areas), Cluj (Floreşti district), 
Constanţa (Palagu Mare district) and Braşov (Săcele district). 
In addition, though the main focus of central government's housing policy 
was supposed to be the strengthening of private property through 
encouraging and subsidizing mortgage loans (ANL), the Ministry also made a 
commitment that it would continue and scale up its contribution to the social 
housing policy. Through an international loan contracted in 1998 the Ministry 
initiated a scheme to build 2,000 new apartments which would be transferred 
to local governments and used for social emergencies. Thus the central 
government would contribute substantially to the financing of an important 
mandate it had created for local governments in the previous years.  
The combination of housing policies pursued by the central government 
through the Ministry of Transportation and Public Works since 1996 can be 
summarized by distinguishing between its two main components. 
A. ANL was launched in 1999-2000 under the previous center-right 
government as a commercial-type scheme of housing mortgage loans. 
Nostalgia played a role, as the scheme was explicitly supposed to materialize 
the similar plans designed by the historical parties in the interwar period6. 
- interest revolving around market level, with some subsidization that the 
"government may grant" depending on projects 
- firm prices at the time of contract: re-evaluations would occur only when 
inflation is greater than 20% 
- all the new houses would become private property 
The state initiated the scheme with a transfer of about 300 bil Rol (about 20 
mil USD in 1999); today we are in the range of 450 bil Rol/year. The prices 
                                                 
6 The Minister of Public Works between 1997-2000 was a Christian-Democrat coming from a 
family with strong roots in the interwar democratic politics.  
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with building contractors were firmly negotiated and included in the contract. 
For a typical flat, the final price revolved around 200 $/sqm. The estimated 
rate of profit for contractors was around 8-10%. 
Local governments play an important role in this scheme, as they are 
supposed to contribute with the land, exempt the owners of property tax 
until they repay the loan to ANL, pay for extending the roads infrastructure 
and utility grids to the new neighborhoods, and subsidize/facilitate the 
building operations in various other ways (for example, by providing some 
free of charge certain documents and licenses for which other private actors 
have to pay a fee). 
B. Apart from ANL operations, MTPW also runs additional social housing 
schemes such as the ones shown in Fig. 2.  
• “Ordinance 19/1994” – houses (mostly apartments in buildings which 
were unfinished in December 1989) built (or completed) with money 80% 
from the state budget and 20% local budget and sold to young people, 
recently married, etc (see criteria in the ordinance). About 9,000 
apartments completed by now (see Fig. 2), but mostly in early years of 
transition. As it was mentioned above, the stock of unfinished houses 
where the building started before 1989 has by and large ran out, so that 
this program has naturally shrunk. It is hard to determine the total size of 
the operations in this program and the implicit subsidy per unit, since the 
buildings were in various stages of completion. But it would be safe to 
assume that the total sum coming from the central & local budgets was in 
the range of 100-150 million USD.  
• The social housing project launched by the MTPW with a 60 mil USD 
private credit contract with a British company, which was also the building 
contractor (Mivan Kier JV Ltd). These new houses were to be built and 
transferred to local governments to be used for social emergency cases. 
Initiated in late ’98, the loan contract was signed in March 2000 and 
covered the building of 2,000 apartments.  
Like in the case of the mortgage loans scheme, local governments are 
supposed to contribute with land, new infrastructure and connection to 
utilities – or even to contribute cash from their housing development budget 
lines, when they have it.  
 
After the new PSD government came to power in 2001 a number of 
changes were made. First, everything was put under the same roof – that of 
ANL. Thus the Agency ceased to be only the administrator of a commercially-
oriented public mortgage fund, and incorporated a significant social mandate. 
As it turned out, this change would prove to be more difficult than initially 
planned. Second, component B (social) was re-emphasized at the expense of 
A (commercially-based operation). Since the resources were not earmarked 
to each of them in the first place, it is difficult to document this with financial 
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data. But the physical output figures discussed in the next section give a 
strong hint in this direction. An additional private loan of 100 mil USD was 
contracted from the Development Bank of Europe to meet the high targets 
the government has set for itself in the electoral campaign with the B 
component.  
Third, prices to the beneficiaries were raised on component A form 200 
USD/sqm to about 350-450 USD/sqm, depending on the type of building. 
The current government blames the previous one for setting prices included 
in contracts unrealistically low, which may have caused the quality problems 
signaled by beneficiaries (see also Fig. 5 below). On the other hand previous 
government's officials blame the current administrations for raising prices too 
much. They say this may have happened both intentionally, in order to 
siphon off funds, or as a result of shifting from condominiums to detached 
houses; or unintentionally – higher prices reflects the costs of uncertainty to 
the contractor, as the downpayment from clients was reduced from 30% to 
10%, and the builder gets less money upfront having to rely on more 
numerous installments from ANL. Briefly, the pressure on contracting 
companies to extend more commercial credit to ANL has made the houses 
more expensive. 
2.3. Financing the housing policy 
However, the most visible change introduced in 2001 was the significant 
overall scaling up of the operations compared to what the previous 
government had attempted, almost by an order of magnitude. The target for 
the 2001-04 mandate was set at 28,000 new units in the component A 
(mortgage loans) and 38,000 in component B (social housing to be leased 
out, mostly to young families). This was an extremely ambitious goal – 
probably too ambitious, as Fig. 3 shows.  
There were many difficulties which contributed to the rather spectacular 
failure of the housing policy, and they will be discussed in the next section. 
But the most important was probably the initial miscalculation of resources 
available. If in 1999 when the social housing program was launched, the 
initial loan of 60 mil USD was meant to finance the building of 2,000 
apartments, at an average cost of 30,000 USD per unit. When the whole 
operation was scaled up in 2001, the government failed to explain where 
they would find more than 1 bil USD to finance the 38,000 units promised. 
What is more, the picture became murkier since the current government also 
promised it would build 400 school sporthalls during this mandate. Though 
formally they are not ANL's responsibility, there is anecdotal evidence that 
the effort to complete these sporthalls is making a dent in the resources 
which would otherwise be devoted to the housing schemes.  
There is no surprise therefore that ANL faced serious financial problems when 
it tried to implement the two schemes. First, as the price per sqm of units 
built with mortgage loans went up, the prospect of putting affordable, mid-
level houses on the market became increasingly remote. Instead ANL was 
naturally pushed towards developing more expensive, up-market property 
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such as the new neighborhoods of detached houses launched in 2002-03. 
The typical example is "Henri Coandă" project in Bucharest – a lot of about 
1,100 units for which the estimated final price will be in the range of 400-500 
USD/sqm7. And even this price will include a lot of implicit and explicit 
subsidies, since the common property will be developed mostly at the local 
government's expense and the purchasing contracts are VAT exempt.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Rough estimates for 2003 since MTPW and ANL have not produced clear and 
consistent reports regarding the finalized units 
The situation is even more dramatic on component B – social housing – 
where the central and local governments have to bear the full cost of the 
program. So far money could be found to cover only about 35-40% of the 
costs of the proposed policy between 2001-04. In a last minute attempt to 
find additional resources and close the financing gap for component B (and 
the school sporthalls informally attached to it) the government tried in March 
this year to circumvent banking regulations and take a credit of about 200 
mil USD from CEC, the savings bank which is still state-owned. The move 
was met with harsh criticism from the Central Bank, IMF and the media and 
it had to be abandoned. Currently there are signs that MTPW attempts to find 
some 100 mil USD in the state budget to make up for the shortfall. Under 
these circumstances it is obvious that reaching even half of the announced 
target would be a great success. Most likely, the government will struggle to 
                                                 
7 These are just estimates, however. The new contracts are less firm as far as the final price is 
concerned than the first ones concluded in 2000, thus introducing an additional element of 
uncertainty to the clients.  
Fig. 3. Policy targets and accomplishments in the housing 
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put on the market about a quarter of the 38,000 social housing units by the 
end of 2004. 
Fig. 4. The cost vs. available resources for the two components, 
2001-04 – a yawning gap 
Component Estimated 
cost, USD 
Sources of funds Available, 
USD 
Deficit, 
USD 
A. Mortgage loans: 
20,000 units 
140-160 
mil* 
State budget/local 
budgets 
about 100 
mil 
40-60 mil 
  State budget** 300 mil  
B. Social housing: 
38,000 units 
1,150 mil International loan 100 mil 650-700 
mil 
  Local 
governments*** 
50-100 mil  
* Meant to cover subsidy to the credit, various fees, land viabilization, infrastructure, 
connection to utilities (average 8,000-10,000 USD/unit); it does not include the price 
of land 
** Item (a) in Fig. A at the beginning of this material 
*** From own revenues and the housing fund allocated by MTPW (item 21 in Fig. A 
at the beginning of this material – 35 mil USD between 2001-04) 
 
The role of the local governments in the housing policy has become less and 
less clear as the targets became more ambitious and the goals more 
numerous. Though in principle they should be happy to bring new 
investments in their community, the reality on the ground is more complex. 
First, LGs enthusiasm to cooperate in A-type operations (commercial 
mortgage loans) has cooled down once they saw there are substantial costs 
to the local budget associated to the scheme. In many localities it is really 
difficult to find appropriate plots of land which would be attractive enough for 
clients so that they are willing to pay the substantial price per sqm 
presupposed by a commercial loan. Second, especially in cities where mayors 
belong to opposition parties, they do not want to make what they regard as 
an open-ended commitment of resources to a national policy for which the 
central government is likely to take all the political credit. As a result local 
governments were in general slow to contribute from their own resources to 
the investment policies of the MTPW, especially to the social housing part. 
When they did, they relied mostly on special grants and transfers received 
from the same central government (such as item 21 in Fig. A at the 
beginning of this material).  
The in-kind subsidy mentioned above, in the form of free land, building 
permits, utility connection and VAT exemption can be substantial. Save for 
the VAT exemption it is covered by the local governments, so it is likely to 
function as a strong deterrent for LGs to engage in cooperation with ANL. The 
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average subsidy can be inferred as a difference between the price paid by the 
beneficiaries on their contracts with ANL and the price they have got on the 
free market when they sold their new property. As the law did not ban the 
selling of property in any way, some apartments have already entered the 
real estate market one or two years after completion. The analysis in Fig. 5 
below refers to an average 100 sqm apartment in a condominium begun in 
2000 and completed in 2002 in Bucharest. The subsidy can be substantially 
higher in the case of detached houses projects initiated after 2001.  
Fig. 5. Case study: implicit subsidy for property built on ANL 
mortgage loan 
 
              USD 
Price 
paid to 
ANL 
Additional private 
investment by 
client* 
Price for 
which it 
was sold 
Implicit 
subsidy 
100 sqm apartment in 
condominium, 
Bucharest 
 
20,000 
 
7-8,000 
 
38,000 
 
10,000 
* To remedy the poor quality of work 
Since only 1,500-1,800 housing units were completed in the component A 
until now, the total implicit subsidy from local governments to the new 
owners extrapolated from the case in Fig. 5 may be the range of 15-20 mil 
USD. But if we go back again to the government plan to build 20,000 such 
units between 2001 and 2004, the total implicit subsidy would be around 200 
mil USD. This is almost a third of the combined budget of the large cities 
which is earmarked for housing and public services, which includes the 
component B and all other utilities rehabilitation & maintenance. It is unlikely 
that local governments will be ever able to come up with such a substantial 
contribution in land and cash.  
There are also significant costs to the local governments in the long run. 
Having the new owners of new houses built on mortgage loans exempt from 
property tax (the main source of local own revenues) may not be a problem 
while their number is still insignificant – for the time being, this is just a 
questionable by minor social reallocation. More important is the new mandate 
created for the local authorities by the social housing component: the new 
condominiums are leased out to families (mostly young, first-time owners) at 
very low rates which are unlikely to cover the costs of maintaining the 
property: between 5-10 USD/month. Not only is the management of the new 
municipal assets a difficult task for which most LGs are unprepared, but 
based on previous experience with publicly-owned residential property a 
quick deterioration of the housing stock is likely to occur, at least in some 
buildings, and the authorities will struggle financially to keep them from 
depreciating.  
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2.4. Conclusions and policy issues 
• There has been confusion regarding the ultimate intentions of the housing 
policy, especially after 2001. If the emphasis is put on social housing 
(with a positive discrimination for young, first-time owners), and less on 
the commercial mortgage loans, this means the whole housing policy is 
diverted from its original stated goal when ANL was created – i.e. to 
stimulate the mortgage credit market, very weak back in 1999-2000, by 
reducing the transaction costs between the three private partners: 
developers, clients and the credit institutions. In other words, initially the 
policy was meant to encourage the development of private property. Later 
on the emphasis was shifted towards (re)creating new public property, as 
social units are not supposed to be sold to tenants (though the possibility 
cannot be completely ruled out, especially if the new municipal units 
become a political liability in the future), with all the typical problems 
attached to managing it. Moreover, this strategic decision, which is a 
reversal of the privatization trend of the early ‘90s, was never discussed 
in these terms and assumed explicitly. Before such a strategic decision is 
made – as minister Mitrea implied when he announced recently in a press 
conference that ANL may completely withdraw from mortgage lending 
(component A) in 3-4 years – it would be good to launch a proper public 
debate.  
• Even the original plan of stimulating the development of private 
residential property, as it was defined by the previous center-right 
government, had its weaknesses. The mortgage credit scheme implies 
subsidies in various points, the magnitude of which has never been 
assessed explicitly. Evidence shows that the subsidy can go as high as 20-
30% of the market price of property (see Fig. 5 above). This may be 
acceptable as long as ANL focuses on developing affordable houses for the 
lower-middle social categories. However, once ANL starts to engage in up-
market projects in trendy areas of the main cities, the high subsidization 
from the rest of the community become a moral problem. Private 
construction business associations have estimated that each Romanian 
family pays an average of 120 Euro/year on subsidies to the "privileged 
clients of ANL"8.  
• Private developers and construction companies also claim that subsidized 
ANL contracts create unfair competition and crowd-out private 
investment. The precise effects are hard to pin down but there is some 
evidence to back their allegations. In 2003, as the ANL schemes gained 
speed (Fig. 3), the number of housing units completed in Romania with 
private funds went down by 4.3%, for the first time in the last fours 
years. In the same time the number of units built with public funds more 
than doubled. This is a question hard to answer, but worth asking: is ANL 
really stimulating the development of private property? or it merely 
                                                 
 "Concurenţa ANL a diminuat livrările de locuinţe în sectorul privat", Ziarul Financiar, 20 
martie 2004. 
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substitutes private investments with publicly subsidized schemes, building 
houses that would have been built on the private market anyway? It 
would be useful to explore this issue empirically in a more coherent 
manner and give an informed input into the decision-making process. 
• The changes introduced in 2001 have added new layers of complications, 
as the government has raised the stakes, gave new social mandates to 
ANL and in the same time embarked on a series of prestige projects 
unrelated to the housing policy but which are likely to piggyback on the 
same pool of resources (such as the 400-some school sporthalls). Not 
only that this has made the policy targets more difficult to accomplish, 
but it also became more difficult to distinguish between the commercially-
oriented (subsidized) operation and the pure social schemes. There is a 
permanent tendency of the policy-makers to avoid clear commitments 
and figures in the official reports and play hide-and-seek with the policy 
targets which are shifted from one component to the other. Some cross-
subsidization may also take place between components, though this is 
also difficult to demonstrate based on the data currently available.  
• The criteria and mechanisms of decision and allocation of resources 
remain by and large discretionary and obscure, for all the components of 
the housing policy. The County Councils “centralize the needs coming 
from territory” and pass the information up to MTPW. Then resources are 
passed down to counties following no clear rules or guidelines – 
“proportionately” as some public officials claim.  One element may be that 
“the more advanced investments are served first”, which is in itself a 
controversial principle to distribute funds.  
• The general problem of intergovernmental transfers in Romania is present 
here too: County Councils intermediate the money flows and decide on 
allocations even if they have no formal attribution in this policy area. This 
complicates unnecessarily the relations between tiers of government and 
opens the possibility for them to interfere with the housing funds; or to 
make other earmarked or non-earmarked grants conditional upon 
cooperation in this particular domain. Many budgetary items have been 
recently defined by the government more flexibly precisely in response to 
the financing crisis in the housing sector (for example, money for roads 
can now be used to finance infrastructure for the new ANL projects). 
Therefore the ministry or the county councils can use them now as 
instruments for inducing discipline and a more cooperative behavior in 
local governments, who otherwise have little incentive to participate in 
such costly schemes. 
• The capacity of local governments to administer the new stock of public 
residential property should be a factor to be considered when decisions 
are made where and how much to build. The natural propensity to cut as 
many ribbons as possible should be tempered by the shortage of 
managerial expertise and maintenance funds. Problems of over-
investment have already begun to appear in the case of the new 
sporthalls built by MTPW: maintaining and paying utilities for them, 
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especially in winter time, is beyond the possibility of many small or 
medium-sized local governments already sunk in arrears. Without proper 
planning there is a risk that similar problems will appear in the case of the 
expending municipal residential property, especially the one developed 
through social housing schemes for which the rent does not cover 
maintenance costs.  
• One important aspect related to institutional capacity is the allocation of 
houses according to strict formal criteria. This is important on both 
components of the policy, because in both cases the benefits accruing to 
clients are substantial – an implicit subsidy worth the average salary for 
3-4 years on component A; or rent at trivial levels (50-100 USD/year) 
virtually in perpetuity. As a result the pressure is high on both ANL and 
the local governments from would-be clients to get access to such 
contracts. The decision-makers would be well-advised to have a second 
look at the fundamental parameters of the housing policy, and the 
network of weak institutions which are mandated to implement it. Even if 
in theory such a public policy may work, the matter remains open 
whether in the current context the Romanian central and local authorities 
will manage to prevent its transformation into a case study in rent-
seeking.  
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3. ROADS POLICY 
 
Summary of problems 
• The Romanian roads sector is chronically underfinanced. Considering the 
resources in the last years, overall, the roads infrastructure is degrading 
faster than it is maintained and upgraded.  
• The limited funding is allocated through political decisions for projects of 
questionable priority and low economic efficiency, but of great visibility 
and prestige, (as highways or bridges with no traffic). Allocation of funds 
towards counties is also done in a discretionary manner, ignoring the 
criteria stipulated by law. 
• Lack of monitoring, control and transparency leads to great differences in 
costs per kilometer for similar works executed in different regions with 
different contractors. 
• Due to lack of transparence, the Romanian public is aware only of partial 
and superficial aspects of the national roads policy, lacking a global view 
of priorities and the way these are implemented. As a result, the real 
public debate is lacking in the sector which will involve the larges public 
investments in the near future. 
 
The infrastructure represents vital lubrication for any economic machinery, 
thus addressing the problem of public roads in Romania, including 
administration and public finance for the sector, is of extreme importance. 
Well built, maintained and safe roads network can contribute with value 
added of 3 to 5% of GDP, as the World Bank estimates. Also, following the 
same figures, transport commonly accounts for 5 to 8% of total paid 
employment, and public investment in transport typically accounts for 
between 2 and 2.5% of GDP and may rise as high as 3.5% in countries that 
are modernizing outdated transport infrastructure or building new transport 
infrastructure9. In Romania the transport sector contributes 4.8% of the GDP 
and accounts for 5% of the country’s employment. But the public investment 
in the sector is only about 1% of the GDP, half of what is the minimum 
standard of 2% in Western countries. 
Unfortunately, while transport has the potential to account for economic 
growth, in Romania the total annual loss due to road traffic accidents has 
been estimated to be about 2.5% of the GDP. In 2002 there have been a 
number of 2,398 fatalities on roads (46% pedestrians), and a total of 8175 
persons who have suffered accidents. Thus if loss of one human life were 
                                                 
9 The World Bank, 
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/ECA/Transport.nsf/Countries/Romania?Opendocument 
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estimated at €1 million10, the total loss in the economy from accidents on 
roads is as high as €2 billion. The main causes for this are poor road 
infrastructure, poor technical state of vehicles, limited effectiveness and 
penetration of traffic management and law enforcement. Not yet so 
pregnant, and neither accounted for in Romania, are the health costs from 
pollution by automobiles. However, considering the constant increase in 
traffic (see Fig.1) this can also become a problem that will need future 
consideration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: National Administration of Roads 
 
In Romania the general factors that influence the transport sector are: (1) 
globalization of trade, that greatly expanded the scope for international trade 
in goods and services, (2) congestion and pollution growing particularly in 
cities, (3) transport sector deficits, namely, poorly managed public transport 
services that impose a heavy burden on public budget, and (4) expenditure 
needs required to maintain and modernize existing transport infrastructure 
(currently needed around $450 million per year accounting for about 4.5% of 
the state budget). With problems ranging from under-financing, to poor 
administration, lack of quality control, lack of a comprehensive and feasible 
national strategy, the public officials at national level are in the position to 
consider trade-offs such as the followings. 
1.1. Trade-offs  
The public roads system cannot be treated separately from its functions – 
that of keeping the population and the goods moving within the country and 
abroad efficiently, thus improving the economic performance and the welfare 
of the population. A national policy for roads can be designed only by 
                                                 
10 In 1996 the World bank estimated one fatality at a price of $130 000 
Fig. 1. Increase in annual average daily traffic: 
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explicitly delimitating feasible options and priorities. Inevitably, the options 
are political, as the technicians can only contribute at formulating the right 
questions. There will always be conflicting interests and for this reason a 
transparent debate process should be followed. A strategy for developing and 
maintaining the national roads system should be flexibly integrated with 
other national strategies for economic development, human resources 
development, or tourism.  
In conditions of scarce financial resources, at national level decision makers 
need to choose from a series of options to establish priorities and design 
such a strategy. The public debate should focus around the following options: 
• Local autonomy versus national uniform system of roads. One also 
needs to decide at what level the local autonomy should occur. 
• What activities can remain public, what is being contracted out, and 
what can be entirely privatized? In this context, several activities, 
especially the non-capital intensive ones (such as maintenance), are 
harder to contract out. Who will undertake those activities? Also, who 
is to oversee and ensure quality control, in relationship with the 
contractors for the entire national roads system and works carried out. 
• Time trade-off: should a shorter-term view be kept in mind, to cover 
the needs for the next nears, or should one chose expensive solutions 
for the longer term (ex: four-lane national roads vs. highways) 
• Spatial trade-off: build roads where there is traffic already (i.e. 
development); or build roads in order to trigger development, to 
answer needs to reduce isolation of the population. 
• Have a rigid fund for roads or a flexible allocation through the national 
budget, with allocation based on a multi-annual strategy. 
• Have the transfers to the local governments made based on formulas, 
criteria, or flexibly decided, case by case by the national government 
(for counties), and by the county councils (for localities) 
Based on answers to the first three points, we can define the national policy, 
priorities and allocation of attributions on center-regional-local levels, and 
the degree of local autonomy for roads. Based on the answers to the last 
three points we can define the policy for allocation of funds, based on the 
criteria incorporated in laws. However, before drawing conclusions, we will 
present a short overview of the status of transport in Romania. 
1.2. Short overview of the Road Transport in Romania 
In Romania, due to insufficient investment, maintenance and repair, the 
transport infrastructure does not meet current needs of a market economy 
and lags behind Western Europe. The existing infrastructure, built on the 
organic pattern of old roads connecting localities, with no city by-passes, is 
extremely inefficient in terms of safety and speed limits. Several past 
programs – national or international donor-financed – aimed to strengthen 
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institutional capacity, reorganize the roads administration, and improve road 
maintenance and rehabilitation, but severe problems still persist. 
The road network totals approx. 78,601 km, of which 20% are national roads 
carrying 60% of the traffic. Road density, with regard to both population and 
land area, is the lowest among all CEE countries and, thus, pollution is not 
yet an issue but in major cities. Transport infrastructure, according to the 
Romanian Constitution is public property of the State. These assets are 
administered by national entities, or companies or corporations under the 
jurisdiction or the monitoring of the Ministry of Transportation – which may 
award these assets for concession11. 
As far as road transportation is concerned, the Ministry of Transportation is in 
charge of setting up the general transport strategy and policy, defining the 
needs in terms of networks development, dealing with international 
organizations and organizing the transport operation through licensing of 
operators and setting up rules and regulations for the transport sector. The 
national roads are managed by the National Company of Roads (NCR; 
previously the National Administration of Roads, NAR) – an autonomous 
entity under the Ministry of Transportation, in process of being privatized 
since 2003. They represent approximately 15,093 km of national roads. 
Because of the difficulties faced by the railway companies and the natural 
advantages of the road transportation, the latter is playing an increasing role 
all over the region.  
Public roads in Romania (excluding street networks) are classified in a three-
tier system: national (main) roads (14,696 km), district (county) roads 
(36,020 km), and communal roads (27,781 km). In addition there are 
approximately 30,000 km village roads serving the rural villages' needs, and 
farming related activities (Fig.2 and 3). All roads are often re-classified, and 
for this reason, the exact length in each category varies greatly from year to 
year. 
If the national roads are administered and managed by the National 
Company of Roads, the district (county) roads are administered by the 
County Council and managed by the County's technical department. The 
communal roads are administered and managed by the village councils aided 
by the County council's technical office. Construction, maintenance and 
administration of the national road network are also the responsibility of 
National Company of Roads, secondary account holder, after the MoT. NCR is 
at present dependent on the budget for almost all its resources (only some 
revenue is derived directly from bridge tolls, transit permits and overloading 
charges levied at the frontier posts). The field organization consists of 7 
directorates (Bucuresti, Craiova, Timisoara, Cluj, Brasov, Iasi and Constanta) 
further divided into 41 sections, their borders coinciding with those of 
administrative districts (counties). Each section is divided into 4-6 districts 
                                                 
11 Transport Infrastructure Regional Study (TIRS) in the Balkans/ Final report, Louis Berger 
SA, 2000  
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for routine and winter maintenance. In addition, there are some 140 
‘formations’ for periodic resurfacing and strengthening, each equipped with 
one asphalt plant and the corresponding transport and paving equipment. 
Fig.2 Network by type  
Description Road Network* 
 Paved Gravel Earth Total 
National Roads - NR 14,462 98% 221 - 221
Districts Roads - DR 18,111 67% 7,718 1,138 26,967
Communal Roads - CR 4,951 16% 18,686 7,529 31,166
Total 37,524 26,625 8,667 72,816
% 51% 37% 12% 100%
*(Excluding street networks) Source: The World Bank, 1997 
 
Fig.3 Network by type and administration 
Description Administration Length (km) 
Motorways  114 
National Roads - NR NCR 15,093 
District Roads - DR County Councils 36,010 
Communal Roads - CR Local Councils 27,781 
TOTAL  78,998 
Streets Local Councils  22,328 
Streets in Rural Settlements 
 
Municipalities, Cities and 
Communes 
97,660 
Source: National Administration of Roads, 2004 
 
Traffic of all types has been adversely affected by the large downturn and the 
restructuring of the economy away from heavy industry which was 
traditionally a large user of transport. Road traffic grew rapidly in the 70s but 
stagnated in the 80s as it was suppressed by physical control and regulation. 
Car traffic increased dramatically in 1990, but fell back thereafter as fuel 
prices were adjusted to reflect world market prices. Currently, both in 
absolute numbers and percentage increases, traffic is on the rise compared 
to previous measurement (once every 5 years). In spite of this increase, 
Romania still does not have very heavy traffic (Fig 4). For a distribution of 
the traffic on length of roads, figures from 1990 and 1995 show that less 
than 20% of the network had traffic levels in excess of 6,000 vehicles per 
day (VPD) and only around 5% 10,000 VPD (Fig.5). 
Also, all traffic from the Western borders towards East combined is 
approximated at no more than 35,000 VPD (vehicles per day, annual 
average) – corresponding to the capacity of one four-lane highway. Even 
from this perspective only, two West-East highways are highly unlikely to be 
a profitable investment. 
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Fig.4. Vehicles Per Day - National Annual Average 2000 
Type of Roads 
National 
Roads 
District 
Roads Communal Roads 
VPD - 2000 3776 1327 621 
 
       
Fig. 5. Traffic in VPD 1990 (km) 1995 (km) 
<1,000 1,796 1,575 
1,000 to 3,000 6,353 5,294 
3,000 to 6,000 4,407 4,547 
6,000 to 10,000 1,136 1,910 
> 10,000 347 718 
TOTAL* 14,039 14,044 
* excludes length through municipalities, Source: The World Bank 
 
Engineering for the road system has generally been prepared by the 
institutes of the MoT. Private engineering consultants have emerged, often in 
joint-venture with foreign consultants. Road design standards became more 
appropriate to traffic flows and physical characteristics, but there are still 
several technical mistakes made, as often no proper financial and feasibility 
analysis are carried out prior to project implementation. For example, 
widening the existing locality-connecting network is an expensive exercise – 
for the state, localities and users – while it does not solve the problem of 
speed limits and traffic safety in localities. Costs are similar or even higher 
than building new roads, on shorter routes, not crossing localities. 
1.3. Financing roads 
In Romania the level of public finance for roads is low at around 1% of GDP 
in 2003 compared to the minimum of 2% in Western countries. In 2004 the 
forecast budget for roads is at around US$ 758 mil (about 1.38% of the GDP) 
but this amount includes the service of all the credits taken for past and 
current projects. In 2002 NCR’s budget amounted to around US$ 308 million 
(without the payable debts), while the 2004 budget will be approximately 
US$ 680 (including payable credits, etc.). Starting 2004, the NCR budget 
does not comprise the funds to be transferred towards local governments. 
In the past, expenditure for roads has been fairly constant fluctuating 
between US$260 to 300 million per year (Fig.6). If until 1996 the distribution 
of funds between the national roads and the rest of the network has been 
stable at 50:50, with the introduction of the Road Fund this ratio changed to 
65:35, roughly reflecting traffic flows. Capital expenditures have mostly gone 
to improving and strengthening existing roads rather than new construction – 
even if the latter are necessary for safety and efficiency (eg. city by-passes, 
crossroads, etc). Priority has been given to basic repairs and keeping the 
road surface in as good condition as possible at the least cost. 
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Fig. 6. Roads Expenditures ( US$ mil)       
  National Roads   
District and Communal 
roads Total 
 
recurrent 
costs 
capital 
costs
total recurrent 
costs
capital 
costs
total USD - Million
1989 104 35 140 129 36 164 304
1992 72 6 78 94 13 107 185
1995 215* 68 283 98 30 128 411
* The amounts include the rehabilitation costs 
 
Fig. 7. Projection of the revenues from the Road Fund, US$ mil, 1996 
value 
Years 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Road Fund 
Revenues 0 0 0 151 156 160 165 170 174 181
Total road sector 
revenues 262 251 350 445 459 415 431 339 345 353
Source: The World Bank 
 
In terms of revenues, until 1996 road user charges consisted in: annual 
vehicle license fees; vehicle registration fees, a 5% tax on the ex-refinery 
price of fuel and various fees and tolls. Taxation level was low and total 
revenues amounted to some US$ 63 million in 1992, half of it from fuel 
taxes. Also, fuel tax revenues did not increase in parallel with traffic and fuel 
consumption (as price of fuel was gradually reduced in real terms). Revenues 
from tolls and transit fees almost doubled since 1992  
For increasing and stabilizing revenues, Law 118 was passed in October 1996 
for establishing a Road Fund, which was scheduled to function until 2003. 
This was fed from 25% charge on ex-refinery prices (exclusive of excises) of 
fuels and 10% of charge on ex-factory prices (excluding excises) of vehicles. 
The Fund generated around US$ 200 million per annum starting in 1997. It 
grew with traffic and vehicle purchases, and did better than projected. Other 
fees and tolls generated around US$ 35 million per year. These two sources 
would cover the variable costs of the network but fell short of covering total 
roads costs estimated at US$ 400-450 million per year. This Fund was shared 
between the national roads (65%) and county roads (35%). The road fund 
income covered the administrative expenses, routine maintenance, loan 
service payments, and limited rehabilitation costs of the national roads. It 
also covered most costs of county roads' rehabilitation and maintenance. 
 
1.4. Financing and administration of District and Communal Roads 
In 1990 the process for transforming the state owned companies, whatever 
their managerial body, into autonomous or commercial companies, was 
started (Law 15/1990). In 1997 the district roads, previously patrimony of 
the central state, were transferred to the County Governments through 
Urgency Ordinance 43/1997. The Economic Departments at the level of 
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Taxes 
County Councils were transformed in autonomous entities (RAs) - a step 
towards privatization of public services. Also, through Law of local 
administration 215/2001 a new entity with juridical personality, subordinated 
to the County Council and called Directia pentru Administrarea Drumurilor si 
Podurilor Judetene (County Level Roads and Bridges Administration) was 
created with the task of developing and maintaining the road network (that 
under its direct jurisdiction and the communal roads).  
County Councils perform an assessment of the technical status of all the 
roads in the county, even if not all under county administration, and establish 
the total need of works and funding. The findings and proposed projects are 
then submitted for approval to the Ministry of Transportation, through the 
National Company of Roads (which oversees the process and offers technical 
expertise if the case). The communes submit all program proposals through 
the County Councils for review, from where the programs are sent to the 
Ministry of Transportation through the National Company of Roads. The 
Municipalities can request funds directly from the 35%, not being obliged to 
run their requested amounts through a program of the County Council (see 
Fig. 8). Theoretically, these funds should be for financing district roads 
crossing Municipalities, but in practice this is not verified when the programs 
and transfers are approved. 
Fig.8 The process of program proposal and financing of roads 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ministry of Transportation, Public 
Works and Tourism  
Local Councils of 
cities or communes 
Nat. Company of 
Public Roads (NCPR)
Municipalities 
Ministry of Public Finance 
County Councils 
Contractor DR  
& Streets 
Contractor 
DRs  
Contractor 
NRs 
Territorial units of 
NCPR 
approval 
approval 
Contractor CR  
& Streets 
Program approval: 
Financial flow:  
Budget approval:  
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If approved, the programs are financed from own sources and/or from 
special funds (or in 2003-2004, earmarked sums from the national budget). 
After approval from the Ministry, the programs are divided in quarterly 
sections and funds allocated on a monthly basis through credit requests one 
month in advance of the operations being carried out. Until 2002 the 
Counties would benefit of 35% of the Road Fund (which passed through the 
NCR). Currently, the funds transferable to counties appear as a separate line 
in the state budget, amounting to approx. US$ 77 mil, representing only 
10.3% of the total budget for roads that appears in the state budget for 
2004. Also, these funds will not be disbursed by NCR, as they used to be, but 
directly by MTPW. 
Law 118/1996 established a formula to be used for allocating funds among 
counties, that takes into account the length of district roads, traffic, and 
technical status: 
 
L1     – total length of DRs in the county 
Vpd  – annual average of vehicles per day 
(vehicle/24h) in the county 
L      – total length of DRs in Romania 
VPD – the annual average of vehicles per day 
on DRs in Romania 
          K2     – is an indicator of the technical quality 
of the roads and the County priorities 
established   
 
In practice it was never certain if and how this formula was used. Of their 
35% share the County Councils have the obligation to allocate funds for 
communal roads and, lately, for streets connecting the new neighborhoods 
built under the national housing program (ANL -- see the next section of this 
report). The County Councils have (or take) the freedom of allocating these 
funds, theoretically on a program basis, on criteria established at County 
level. For example, in 2003 in Timiş County a program of ROL 100 billion 
(US$ 3.01 million) was proposed and a financing of ROL 30 billion (US$ 0.9 
million) was approved for 2003. The criteria – not really quantifiable and 
more like goals – used for further allocation within the county were:  
- maintenance and repairs of roads for safe traffic  
- isolated activities   
- follow the strategy of the County Councils for arranging the access 
towards the center of communes, and access to the county capital city.  
- improving the technical quality of the road connections for some 
isolated localities. 
- repairing main district roads.   
 
Law 118/1996 was abolished by OG 3/2003. New methodological norms 
appeared but the formula for allocating the 35% among beneficiaries is in 
principle the same.  
 
K1 = L1 * vpd/L * VPD 
K   = K1 * K2 
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1.5. Specific problems  
The problem regarding Romania’s public roads is manifold:  
(1) low level of funding overall, which reflects the low priority attached to this 
sector in the general budget process (NCR's budgetary cycle has closed in 
2002 with surplus of about 20-25% of the total – which shows that it was 
used as a buffer for controlling the total government deficit, while in fact 
NCR has large arrears). 
(2) unclear allocation rules for the fraction of the money distributed to local 
governments (both tiers) 
(3) low level of technical and administrative capacity in many local / county 
governments  
These aspects can only be addressed simultaneously, because for example it 
does not make sense to pump additional resources into a system which is 
opaque and does not function according to proper criteria. For example, even 
when capacity exists, the motivation for efficient, transparent and 
coordinated approach for repairing and maintaining the national roads 
network is missing. There are no appropriate levers for holding accountable 
the responsible entities (if anyone ever knew who these were) for the extra 
costs of an inefficient and hazardous roads system.  
The Special Fund for Rural Roads 
Unlike the Road Fund, the Special Fund for Laying Gravel on Communal 
and Village Roads (Law 577/1997) was maintained. This Special fund is 
fed from the Ministry of Transportation and Tourism. The program for 
graveling started slowly as there were no funds available. The procedure 
for including roads in the program and financing is similar to the one for 
communal roads. Programs are approved according to the annex of the 
law. Between 1999 and 2003 the program was extremely slow. In 2003 
there have been no new projects introduced – all were continuations of 
the ones started in previous years. The ordinance 60/2002 stipulates that 
it is mandatory to have a representative of the Ministry of Transportation 
at the gravel laying operations. 
Of the around 60,000 km of earth roads and streets in rural areas, the 
program only covered 11,000 km. For example, in 2003 in Timis County 
ROL 4.5 billion (US$ 135,542) were allocated and 1.5 km built. Usually 
the cost is ROL 2.5 – 3 billion /km. (US$ 75,301 – 90,361) the operations 
carried out being: 1) ballasting, 2) laying gravel, and/or 3) treatment. 
Interestingly, interviews at County Council level revealed that the 
program administrators are more satisfied with this poorly financed but 
steady and predictable program than with the turmoil going on yearly 
around the funds for public roads finance. Thus, in all likelihood more 
transparence and predictability helps the local administrators to plan their 
interventions better, which can not happen in present circumstances in 
the case of district and communal roads. 
ROMANIAN ACADEMIC SOCIETY (SAR) 
 44 
1.5.1. Low financial and administrative capacity  
The constant low level of finance – at 1% of GDP and barely covering 
maintenance -- combined with local economic pressure leads to allocations 
being made in discretionary and political manner, rather than based on 
needs. After years of continuous decay currently the roads network is in its 
worse shape (at point A on Fig.9). Though it is often argued about, overall, 
each county has the road network in bad condition. To repair the entire 
system (bring it to point B in Fig.9) Romania would need about US$ 1.2 
billion per annum for at least two years. These funds should be used only for 
investment in roads, with around US$ 360 million per year for maintenance 
and US$ 120 million per year for traffic safety measures.  
 
 
Fig 9. Struggling to keep pace with the degradation of infrastructure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Partly this bad management at all levels was caused by the rushed and 
untimely privatization – when District and Communal roads were transferred 
to the patrimony of County councils, and, respectively, Communes. Even if 
Counties had some expertise regarding road maintenance and building, there 
was no practice, and arguably no interest, regarding program development, 
contracting out, organizing proper tender procedures, and supervising the 
works carried out by private firms. Moreover, this new situation with no 
proper legal levers for quality control, but new funds being transferred to 
local levels led to twisted incentives and continuous decay of the patrimony. 
As previously mentioned, the funds are not extremely significant, but they 
are significant enough to be used as political capital shaping power relations 
at local level as much as between local and central government levels.  
Even if lately major administrative reorganization took place in the sector, 
responsibilities are not clear (or rather not respected) at different levels. The 
commercial activities, such as investments, constructions, upgrading, volume 
maintenance, are contracted out. Seven enterprises (SAs) of roads and 
bridges were created, with majority state capital, and to be sold in 2003. 
However, even if some progress has been made, a comparison of the 
average cost of applying a 5 cm overlay reflects the system’s inefficiency 
(data are from 1999, but current data are likely to be worse as more 
materials are imported). 
Quality of 
Roads 
Maintenance 
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Fig.10. Comparative average costs for applying 5 cm of overlay 
Country - US$/m2  
Belarus  8.0 
Brazil  8.2 
Estonia  4.6 
Finland  5.2 
Romania  9.2 
Russia  6.7 
USA  5.0 
(Source: The World Bank - compiled from figures available in 1999) 
 
Activities currently managed by the local governments can be placed in two 
categories: unprofitable and profitable. The first category refers activities 
that are cheap, but time consuming and requiring extensive labor (current 
repair works, database collecting and administration, inspections) and are 
more difficult to contract and manage. These are left for direct delivery from 
the County councils, under diverse forms of institutional organization 
(departments, compartments) or entirely left for the autonomous service 
providers (RAs). The second category refers to larger works, with more 
capital involved (development of road structures) the only activity that is of 
interest and appropriate for privatization/ easily contracted out. However in 
conditions of low management capacity, contracting out does not represent 
necessarily a silver bullet because it is still the County that needs to 
supervise and administer contractors. 
The effects of bad management and little funds at county level are 
exacerbated by the lack of coordination at national level, or at least at 
regional level among counties. So far, at local level there are neither clear 
incentives nor capacity to coordinate works. Currently, counties do not even 
know the level of funding each of them receives, and even less about the 
projects proposed by neighboring districts as this data is not easily available 
and understandable. In these conditions, by law NCR has the duty to set 
standards, norms and coordinate programs. The only (and obviously not very 
effective) way NCR does this is through the approval of programs that 
Counties and Municipalities propose.  
Another major fault in the system is the possibility for County Councils to 
request NCR and obtain reclassification of district roads to national ones. This 
usually happens not because the roads are of national interest (fulfilling 
traffic and positioning criteria) but rather because counties wish not to 
administer and fund them. Since transfer levels for roads do not correlate in 
practice with the length of district roads, the incentive is strong for Counties 
to discard these roads. Unfortunately, reclassification only leads to further 
decay, because NCR is unlikely to invest in a road (be that called national) if 
the traffic on it is low and its positioning is not important. 
 
ROMANIAN ACADEMIC SOCIETY (SAR) 
 46 
1.5.2. Opaque and inconsistent financing procedures 
Establishing a Road Fund was welcome in 1996 in conditions of a severely 
underfunded road network. The international donor organizations, such as 
the World Bank or EBRD pushed for this solution as a step in reorganizing the 
system. Unfortunately, the results of abolishing the Fund – basically done for 
increasing transparency – are clearly not those expected. If last year, at least 
the total amount of funding existing for roads was clear, in 2003 the exact 
amount of taxes linked to roads is not known. These allocated funds, 
seemingly more opaque than the fund, were leaving room for discretionary 
allocation. 
The following graphs come to prove that even when the distribution 
mechanism among the counties was established by a formula incorporating 
criteria as length of roads, the technical quality, and traffic, the funds 
actually transferred were not correlated with the mentioned criteria. Fig 11-1 
reveals that actual allocation of funds does not correlate with the length of 
District and County roads.  
Moreover, at county level the information about how much was allocated to 
any of the other counties is not available, except informally. For example, it 
is believed that Timis County, with 130,000 registered vehicles and one of 
the longest roads network, should receive quite a large chunk of the funds, 
but there is no possibility for checking how and if the criteria for traffic and 
length of roads were respected. Traffic data from NCR shows that Timiş has 
an annual average traffic of 721 vehicles per day on district roads – rather 
low and close to the average among counties – but this statistics is not clear 
at County Level, leaving room for interpretation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 11-1. Allocation analysis 1: by length
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Fig. 11-2. Allocation analysis 2: by condition
BC
IF
GJ BT
VN
PH
R2 = 0.0067
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
% c+l roads unmodernized
bn Rol
Fig. 11-3. Allocation analysis 3: by local traffic 
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Fig. 12. Grants to counties from the National Roads Fund in 
2002 – questionable criteria 
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The quality of roads is also a criterion that is unclear and can be subjectively 
interpreted. In our analysis we used a proxy considering the ration between 
un-modernized and modernized roads. The correlation is not statistically 
significant (Fig. 11-2). For traffic we created another proxy, dividing the 
number of registered vehicles in a county with the total length of district and 
communal roads. As Fig 11-3 reveals, correlation is not significant in this 
case either. Fig. 12 displays the overall effect of the discretionary allocations 
by county operated in 2002.  
Abolishing of the Road Fund may create different problems because the 
current sources of funding for roads are not likely to cover the needs. Public 
roads will be mainly financed with a 25% tax on fuel which is included in the 
excise, and tax from automobile sales, also included in the state budget. It is 
planned that a new vigneta (Eurovigneta) will represent the main source of 
income for the National Roads Company. However, the problem that might 
appear is that through sales of Eurovigneta only €150 million can be 
collected (with an estimate for 2003 of €250 million), all this while the annual 
budget of NCR for 2004 is US$681 million (including payable loans, grants, 
etc.). The balance will have to be covered from the state budget.  
Abolishing the Road Fund only created more insecurity and administrative 
burden in a situation in which the administrative capacity of NCR does still 
not match the needs for coordination, management encountered in the 
sector. Also, from the current state budget it seems that the counties receive 
even less funding than from the Road Fund (around 10% compared to the 
previous 35%). 
The Government does have in its plan the ‘reclassification if road network 
and associated changes in administration management and financing in 
roads, and increased efficiency of road works through privatization and 
development of domestic construction industry’ – it remains to be seen how 
this is going to be done. 
1.6. Traffic safety 
The National Company of Roads has the central responsibility for traffic and 
safety. Law 118/1996 established that NCR allocate 10-15% of the funds for 
safety. Unfortunately, it is not transparent and certain if these sums are 
allocated at central, and even less at local level. Currently, the company 
cannot be sued if proven that it did not fulfill its role stipulated through law.  
Nighttime driving causes 50% of fatalities, as US experience reveals, while 
only 25% of vehicle miles take place by night. In this situation, investments 
in nighttime visibility measures worth it both to reduce fatalities but also for 
side benefits such as civic beautification and reduction of crime. A report of 
the Federal Highway Administration in the United States pointed out that 
installing lighting has the highest benefit-cost ratio of all safety 
improvements.  
While traffic accidents cause important losses to the economy, and also road 
improvement without safety measures in place increases the number of 
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accidents due to speeding, there are no legal or other levers to impose safety 
measures. Even more than providing roads, traffic safety should be a public 
good provided by the state, but it is not done so, causing losses of 2.5% of 
GDP per annum. 
1.7. Conclusions – what should/could be done 
Important institutional and financial constrains limit growth in the transport 
sector. Reform is unfinished and chaotic. The system, together with the NCR, 
has been reorganized but its organization, management and technology need 
further support. Maintenance needs a special attention from the state, as it is 
not a profitable and visible activity. Transport should be safe, efficient, 
ensure mobility of labor force and trade, and coordinate with European 
networks. International experience reveals that in the sector of roads 
infrastructure, where such large investment opportunities are at stake, any 
strategy or policy needs to be politically attractive in order to become truly 
feasible. Economists and researchers need to permanently produce analyses 
and participate in public debate with informed opinions, such that they reveal 
policy alternatives that are equally economically suitable and politically 
attractive. In this context, public funding for research and development 
would be justified. Also, strategies need to be flexible in responding to socio-
economic and demographic changes.  
Setting the stage for a real public debate could increase transparency and 
circulation of information in the sector. In Romania, the transporter’s unions, 
or associations are not vocal enough in lobbying for better roads that would 
decrease their losses due to delays when accidents occur or bad roads 
increase transportation time. Equally, civil society representation is weak and 
uninformed. Citizen groups interested in government spending in 
infrastructure should be formed to hold the local and national governments 
accountable for spending decisions. 
It is international practice to pursue technologically sophisticated projects as 
they are a source of pride despite their expense. However, for Romania these 
are too costly and not necessary at an annual average daily traffic of 3,776 
vehicles per day (VPD) on national roads. A motorway would be feasible only 
if in concession of a private firm. Even if the traffic is not high enough to 
make the investment profitable for a private company, the government could 
subsidize the difference, recuperate costs in 20-25 years, and leave 
administration to the company. This would be feasible in the current situation 
when local administrative capacity for a highway is not in place. 
The current legislation might also need some revision since it seems to be 
producing twisted incentives at county level for a race for obtaining national 
funding for projects. At times it is possible that at local level cheaper 
projects, more efficient and with higher social benefits could be designed and 
implemented if only the right incentives were in place.  
Priority should be a better management of funds through coordination and 
increased safety. Also, the network should be used for increasing the mobility 
Working papers no. 26, April 2004 
 51 
of Romania’s rather inert labor force. There is a general tendency in the 
sector for taking on capital intensive projects, thus building new roads, 
instead of investing in projects for efficient management with better long-run 
results. Priorities should be changed towards organizational measures, 
optimal financing systems, and thus overall reducing the need for new 
infrastructure. These types of projects would have a much higher benefit-
cost ratio.  
When funding is insufficient or cut-backs occur these are usually done on the 
maintenance activities and less on capital investment - more visible and 
politically sensitive. As a result, it is important to establish a predictable and 
politically acceptable road maintenance formula. Latvian experience shows 
that roads maintenance is funded with 40% of what it would need and rural 
roads are allocated only 20% of what is needed. Maintenance of highways or 
national roads can be easier, bud district and rural roads have extreme 
length. Financing maintenance requires special attention because it is not an 
attractive enough activity to survive political debates on public expenditures. 
In this context, relying on taxes might have disadvantages. User charges, 
collected separately from the government budget are regarded as a best way 
to ensure optimal and sustainable budgets. The followings constitute brief 
ideas for consideration by policymakers: 
• Coordinate activities – national and local level to attain efficiency with 
the limited resources available. Creating regional administrative bodies 
that can coordinate at least at that level (similar to the metropolitan area 
transport authorities) and ensure services that reduce negative as much 
as positive externalities resulted from lack of coordination. Municipalities 
should also coordinate with Counties. 
• Establish levels of expertise and based on those distribute tasks, and 
allocate corresponding funding.  
• Create levers - legal or else – to hold responsible the entities at 
various levels. Currently, the legislation establishes more or less clearly 
who are the owners, administrators, managers, and suppliers for the 
roads, but there are no clear means for accountability. The problem of 
roads should be brought into public debate in an accessible manner rather 
than using sophisticated and technical terminology, and thus the 
population could hold the Counties accountable for low safety and poor 
quality of roads. 
• Create a simple formula for allocation of funds, and apply it in a 
transparent manner. Anecdotic evidence should be substituted with 
systematic data analysis.  
• Increase administrative capacity and create incentives for applying 
good practices criteria at all levels. 
• Create nationally available and accessible data base. Future 
volume, pattern and demand of transport should be correctly evaluated 
and decisions taken upon those facts; the national data should be reliable, 
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publicly available, coherent at country level, accessible from district level 
so that the system can be coordinated 
• Place priority on safety issues such as city by-passes, intersections, 
marking, lighting, or modernizing roads. Create levers for suing 
responsible administrators for road accidents. 
 
 
